This dissertation examines three enduring questions for the study of conflict. First, I consider how domestic institutions affect threat credibility, arguing that audiences can either help or hinder a leader during bargaining. Second, I show that the success of third party guarantees of civil war treaties is conditional on the guarantor's credibility. Finally, I argue that the willingness of a leader to nurture a reputation depends on their time horizons, and that long time horizons can allow a leader to deter conflict. The first essay considers how leaders communicate in a crisis. Scholars frequently use audience costs to explain how accountable leaders communicate, but these have received mixed empirical support. I argue this apparent disconnect between theory and evidence is due to simplistic assumptions about how audiences use their sanctioning power. I contend that supporters balance concerns over consistency and policy outcomes. As such, accountable leaders' ability to credibly communicate depends on their supporters' policy preferences. I apply this insight using casualty sensitivity as a conditioning policy preference. I expect, and find, that audiences only help a leader commit to fight when fighting is low cost, and actually prevent commitment when fighting is high cost. Audiences have countervailing effects on credibility due to their preferences for leaders who are both consistent and avoid costly conflict. The second essay addresses a puzzle regarding outside enforcement of civil war peace agreements. Instead of fighting, domestic belligerents could have agreed to outside support for a peaceful resolution to their underlying dispute, avoiding war and its costs. Existing theory cannot explain why third parties can end but not prevent conflict. I argue that war breaks out if third parties cannot credibly promise to enforce a peacefully negotiated agreement. Subsequent military intervention serves as a sunk cost signal of the third party's resolve to enforce an agreement, facilitating peace. I test this theory using a new dataset of treaty terms and duration for civil wars that began between 1944 and 1997. Consistent with the theory, guarantees only prolong the post-war peace when the guarantor intervened in the conflict. Guarantees that were not associated with an intervention do not improve the prospects for peace. In the final essay I argue that reputation formation is a type of investment. Leaders pay the costs of fighting in the present, in return for future gains in the form of deterrence. The investment decision depends on whether leaders survive in office to reap the future benefits of their reputation. I formally show that, while long time horizons increase a leader's willingness to fight, this alone does not make reputation formation more likely. As reputations form through the strategic decision to go to war, the chance to form a reputation is determined by the opponent's bargaining strategy. Opponents can "pay'' a leader to forgo the chance to earn a reputation through fighting by making greater concessions. However, an opponent might instead offer small concessions that risk war to learn a leader's resolve. Knowing a leader's resolve gives the opponent an advantage should they bargain in the future. As a result, when both a leader and their opponent have long time horizons, they forgo bargaining concessions that would be acceptable without reputation concerns, leading to war. / A Dissertation submitted to the Department of Political Science in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. / Summer Semester 2018. / July 13, 2018. / Includes bibliographical references. / Mark A. Souva, Professor Directing Dissertation; Jonathan Grant, University Representative; William D. Berry, Committee Member; Robert J. Carroll, Committee Member.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:fsu.edu/oai:fsu.digital.flvc.org:fsu_650277 |
| Contributors | Hauenstein, Matthew (author), Souva, Mark A. (professor directing dissertation), Grant, Jonathan A., 1963- (university representative), Berry, William Dale (committee member), Carroll, Robert J. (committee member), Florida State University (degree granting institution), College of Social Sciences and Public Policy (degree granting college), Department of Political Science (degree granting departmentdgg) |
| Publisher | Florida State University |
| Source Sets | Florida State University |
| Language | English, English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Text, text, doctoral thesis |
| Format | 1 online resource (100 pages), computer, application/pdf |
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