Although Husserl's theory of intersubjectivity has been widely disparaged by phenomenological thinkers, this dissertation shows that; (1) the doctrine is absolutely essential to the integrity of Husserlian phenomenology; (2) Husserl's theory is adequate to account for the experience of another person; and (3) his theory, appropriately interpreted, withstands its critics The necessity for this doctrine results from the very method of phenomenology. In its early stages, Husserl's method requires a 'bracketing' of the ordinary experience of the world in favor of the experience of the world as a 'phenomenal' meaning for a transcendental subject. Through this move, Husserl hopes to achieve a descriptive certainty which will permit philosophy to realize itself as a rigorous science. The goal of such a science is reached, however, only when all experience can be analyzed as the intentional product of acts of consciousness One of our experiences, the experience of the Other, presents a difficulty for phenomenological method. 'Other' means outside of a unitary stream of consciousness; therefore, phenomenology must answer the question of how a single consciousness can constitute that which is other than itself Husserl's solution to the problem rests on his notion of 'pairing,' whereby two transcendental subjects unite in a single meaning by a process of spontaneous fusion of their egos. Two subjects may combine in a common meaning, owing to their reciprocal similarities. This very reciprocity prevents their identity. The intrinsic differences between the members of the pair serve to constitute the meaning, ego/alter ego The difficulty of accounting for transcendental experience, which all transcendental philosophies must face, is thereby resolved. The constitution of the Other makes available his world of immanent experiences which, when shared, becomes a transcendent world The results of this investigation are negative insofar as they cannot compel us to accept Husserlian phenomenology. Yet, these negative results are significant for evaluting the whole of Husserl's philosophy. If the doctrine of intersubjectivity is essential to Husserl's philosophy and it failed, then phenomenology must abandon its claim to be a rigorous science and accept an evaluation of itself as a compilation of interesting insights. Our conclusion indicates another outcome / acase@tulane.edu
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:TULANE/oai:http://digitallibrary.tulane.edu/:tulane_24700 |
| Date | January 1982 |
| Contributors | Haney, Kathleen Mary (Author) |
| Publisher | Tulane University |
| Source Sets | Tulane University |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Rights | Access requires a license to the Dissertations and Theses (ProQuest) database., Copyright is in accordance with U.S. Copyright law |
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