Chapter 1 presents two inadequate theories of belief. Chapter 2 examines three inadequate theories of de re belief. In Chapter 3, I distinguish belief from the other attitudes in terms of the functional role of belief states, and I distinguish among individual beliefs in terms of their mode of presentation and what they represent. A de re belief is defined as a belief about objects the agent has experienced and has a sufficient amount of information about. Chapter 4 defends the Quinean analysis of de re belief sentences in terms of a three-place belief predicate. Chapter 5 presents a more general statement of the logical form of de re belief sentences than either Quine's or Loar's statement, and it presents the truth-conditions for de re belief sentences.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:RICE/oai:scholarship.rice.edu:1911/15767 |
| Date | January 1983 |
| Creators | LEHMANN, JEFFREY SCOTT |
| Source Sets | Rice University |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Thesis, Text |
| Format | application/pdf |
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