This study adapts the crucial distinction between priority in substance and priority in definition in Aristotle's metaphysics to the case of the demonstrative science of geometry. Based on this adaptation, it is argued that a tension between knowledge and reality, which is concomitant with the distinction between priority in definition and priority in substance, does not arise in geometry. This result argues that the root of the tension between knowledge and reality in Aristotle's general metaphysics lies in the physical 'stuff' intuition concerning matter, since this tension in the case of physical objects is absent in the case of geometrical objects. / Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 44-03, Section: A, page: 0785. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--The Florida State University, 1983.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:fsu.edu/oai:fsu.digital.flvc.org:fsu_75079 |
| Contributors | JONES, JOE FRANK, III., Florida State University |
| Source Sets | Florida State University |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Text |
| Format | 201 p. |
| Rights | On campus use only. |
| Relation | Dissertation Abstracts International |
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