Philip Pettit argues that freedom is best defined as non-domination, where domination is understood as subjection to uncontrolled interference. Pettit further argues that government is legitimate when it succeeds in preventing citizens from dominating each other without dominating them in the process, as this allows citizens to enjoy the protection of government without surrendering their freedom. Since Pettit argues that democratic (popular) control over government prevents government from dominating its citizens, Pettit argues that a legitimate, non-dominating state is possible. In this paper I argue that popular control cannot prevent government domination unless one accepts controversial, substantive value judgments about freedom and equality that Pettit claims his theory avoids. / Master of Arts / Philip Pettit argues that freedom is best understood as non-domination. By this, Pettit means that we are free when we have a strong degree of control over our choices and actions. He uses this definition to argue that democracy maintains the freedom of citizens because it means that the actions of government are under the control of citizens. This paper argues, contra Pettit, that citizens lack sufficient individual control over the actions of the government to maintain freedom as Pettit understands it. It further argues that one can only accept that government interference is not freedom reducing if one accepts certain substantive claims about freedom and equality.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:VTETD/oai:vtechworks.lib.vt.edu:10919/110068 |
| Date | 12 May 2022 |
| Creators | Curtis, Samuel John |
| Contributors | Philosophy, MacKenzie, Jordan, Yaure, Philip Christopher, Hersch, Gil |
| Publisher | Virginia Tech |
| Source Sets | Virginia Tech Theses and Dissertation |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Thesis |
| Format | ETD, application/pdf |
| Rights | In Copyright, http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/ |
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