The main purpose of this report is to develop an economic
theory, along the lines of the Bergson- Samuelson social welfare theory,
to regulate the utilization of natural resources in the long -term
interest of a political- economic group of individuals and firms. The
theory, called Collective Utility, qualifies as a "systems approach"
because of its inherent flexibility, generality, and comprehensiveness.
Collective Utility is a function of individual satisfactions and firm
revenues, which are, in general, contingent upon the actions of other
individuals and /or firms. Such interactions are called externalities.
It is the contention of this report that efficient management of
natural resources will follow from efficient control of externalities.
A taxation - subsidy structure is suggested as an efficient control and
the complete mathematics of determining and implementing such a structure
are provided. Finally, the idea of externalities is integrated
within the framework of Collective Utility to form an optimal policy
for the utilization of natural resources using the techniques of
calculus of variations.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:arizona.edu/oai:arizona.openrepository.com:10150/617604 |
| Date | 06 1900 |
| Creators | Dupnick, Edwin Gene |
| Contributors | Department of Hydrology & Water Resources, The University of Arizona |
| Publisher | Department of Hydrology and Water Resources, University of Arizona (Tucson, AZ) |
| Source Sets | University of Arizona |
| Language | en_US |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | text, Technical Report |
| Source | Provided by the Department of Hydrology and Water Resources. |
| Rights | Copyright © Arizona Board of Regents |
| Relation | Technical Reports on Hydrology and Water Resources, No. 05 |
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