This paper will present a study of the Far East Agreements of the Yalta Conference, held from February 4-11, 1945, and will trace them through to their conclusion in the agreements signed by the Soviet Union and Nationalist China in August of the same year. These wartime agreements between the Soviet Union and the United States, subscribed to by Great Britain and later Nationalist China, reflected then existing distributions of power. The Far East Agreements, on the part of the United States, were concluded in the national self-interest of the United States for reasons thought necessary at the time. The majority of the information in this paper was obtained from United States Government documents and first-hand accounts by men who took part in, or observed at meetings and conferences that dealt with the issues being discussed. Reed College documents library supplied the greater bulk of the material, with additional materials being obtained at Portland State University library and Multnomah County library. All other information was obtained on order through the offices of Portland State University library from various libraries throughout the Pacific Northwest. A background and history of the issues are presented to give the reader the proper perspective before the issues are discussed. Strategic positions and conditions of World War II, both prior to and after the Yalta Conference are presented to give the reader a further knowledge of the conditions surroundings the issues discussed. The actual negotiations involving the Far East Agreements and the Sino-Soviet agreements are discussed in greater detail. Certain of the concessions regarding China agreed upon by the United States at the Yalta Conference were thought necessary at the time. Though it was known that these concessions were made at the expense of China the conclusions drawn in this paper will show that the Far East Agreements were a compromise of the continuing viability of the great powers, pending the final defeat of Japan, and not a compromise of principles on the part of the United States, as believed by many historians and critics. In the late 1940’s, and early 1950’s, after the Chinese Communists assumed the predominant position in China, these agreements came under heavy attack and criticism from many sources, including a Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs. This paper will show that much of the criticism and many of the critics were completely unjustified in their beliefs, in that they failed to look at the complete picture and benefited greatly from hindsight. The Far East Agreements were not a radical shift in American China policy. They were not a radical change in traditional American policy. They were thought necessary for both military and political reasons. These agreements were a carefully worked out plan to accomplish three goals: (1) to insure the Soviet participation in the Pacific War at the earliest possible date; (2) to bring about the best possible cooperation between the Soviet Union and the Nationalist government of China; and (3) to limit Soviet expansion in China and prevent China from being divided and torn apart after the war. With the conclusion of the Sino-Soviet negotiations in August of 1945, it was thought that these three goals had been accomplished.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:pdx.edu/oai:pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu:open_access_etds-1699 |
| Date | 01 April 1969 |
| Creators | Davidson, Robert Harold |
| Publisher | PDXScholar |
| Source Sets | Portland State University |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Source | Dissertations and Theses |
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