Yes / This study applies a new multi-focal actor-centered institution-theoretic approach to examine the association between executive pay and the recruitment of social elites to the board of directors in developing countries. We use a sample of 119 initial public offerings (IPOs) from 17 African stock markets to model this relationship. The results suggest that a higher proportion of elites on the board is associated with lower executive pay. This is moderated by institutional quality; that is, lower institutional quality is associated with more directors drawn from social elites and with higher pay, while the opposite is true in higher-institutional-quality environments. Our findings confirm the importance of the social environment within which governance is embedded.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:BRADFORD/oai:bradscholars.brad.ac.uk:10454/18226 |
| Date | 03 December 2020 |
| Creators | Hearn, Bruce, Strange, R., Piesse, J. |
| Source Sets | Bradford Scholars |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Article, Accepted manuscript |
| Rights | © 2017 Elsevier. Reproduced in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/) |
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