This paper examines shareholder disapproval of CEO compensation as expressed through their advisory vote on executive compensation (say-on-pay) as required by Section 951 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. Using a sample of 884 votes by S&P 500 firms in 2011 and 2012, I find that higher CEO salary, a weak link between pay and performance, and higher dilution from stock option grants are associated with lower say-on-pay approval. In addition, I find evidence that shareholders are sophisticated in their examination of CEO compensation by voting against excess compensation over what is deserved due to performance and other determining factors.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:CLAREMONT/oai:http://scholarship.claremont.edu/do/oai/:cmc_theses-1594 |
| Date | 01 January 2013 |
| Creators | Kimmey, Peter |
| Publisher | Scholarship @ Claremont |
| Source Sets | Claremont Colleges |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Source | CMC Senior Theses |
| Rights | © 2013 Peter Kimmey |
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