Among political scientists, there seems to be something of a faulty dilemma. Researchers are often labeled either behavioralists or institutionalists. That is, they study either the attitudes and actions of individuals or they study rules, organizations, and formal structures. This is a faulty dilemma, because institutions can not exist without individuals and individuals do not exist in an environment devoid of institutions. Further, organizations and government bodies are not monolithic entities blindly following instructions from a benevolent dictator. Politics, in a democratic society, is an inherently competitive enterprise. Candidates and parties compete for votes; groups fight for members, resources, and access; and lobbyists battle one another in pursuit of their policy goals. This necessitates a degree of strategic behavior. When deciding how and where to spend campaign funds, a candidate is not only trying to win new votes, but also defend existing supporters and force the opposition to spend money ineffectively. The same is true, when lobbyists decide how and on whom to spend money and effort. Choices are made, with the expectation that the opposition is also acting. However, democratic politics is also based upon cooperation. Parties, interest groups, and even government itself all exist as solutions to collective action problems. These problems exist at multiple levels. First, individuals need to work together, to create organizations and institutions. But then these groups interact with one another and encounter institutional collective action problems. These interactions can be adversarial, such as two political parties competing for power, but they can also be mutually beneficial. Groups may have aligned goals and greater opportunity for success, if cooperation can be achieved. Consider political parties in the United States. If a party formed for every bloc of voters, then there would be many parties competing in any given contest. Because, however, single member districts and plurality rule elections lead to a two-party system, compromise is needed. The Democratic and Republican parties exist, because subgroups recognize that they are stronger together than they are alone. If free and fair elections result (at least indirectly) in the implementation of policies that solve collective action problems, then the most successful competitor is able to determine the solution. In this sense, democratic politics is the process of competing to cooperate or cooperating to compete. This dissertation presents the results of three studies. Underlying each of the chapters is the logic of strategic resource allocation, under competition and cooperation. The first examines economic voting and competition over policy, using a laboratory experiment. The second extends the analysis, with questions placed on a nationally representative survey. Finally, the third chapter presents a laboratory experiment on competition, coordination, and cooperation in lobbying. / A Thesis submitted to the Department of Political Science in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. / Spring Semester, 2013. / March 22, 2013. / Collective Action, Economic Voting, Experiments, Lobbying, Political
Economy / Includes bibliographical references. / Jens Großer, Professor Co-Directing Thesis; John Scholz, Professor Co-Directing Thesis; Mark Isaac, University Representative; John Ryan, Committee Member; Eric Coleman, Committee Member.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:fsu.edu/oai:fsu.digital.flvc.org:fsu_183885 |
| Contributors | Rogers, Jonathan (authoraut), Großer, Jens (professor co-directing thesis), Scholz, John (professor co-directing thesis), Isaac, Mark (university representative), Ryan, John (committee member), Coleman, Eric (committee member), Department of Political Science (degree granting department), Florida State University (degree granting institution) |
| Publisher | Florida State University, Florida State University |
| Source Sets | Florida State University |
| Language | English, English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Text, text |
| Format | 1 online resource, computer, application/pdf |
| Rights | This Item is protected by copyright and/or related rights. You are free to use this Item in any way that is permitted by the copyright and related rights legislation that applies to your use. For other uses you need to obtain permission from the rights-holder(s). The copyright in theses and dissertations completed at Florida State University is held by the students who author them. |
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