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Scientific realism and empiricist antirealism

This dissertation consists of a defence of scientific realism and a critique of empiricist antirealism. Strict empiricism is discussed in Chapter 1, in which it is argued that this variety of empiricism adequately describes only the initial stages of scientific research. Bas van Frassen's empiricist antirealism is then discussed in Chapter 2. Here, it is argued that this new position, although more sophisticated than earlier forms of empiricist antirealism, fails to constitute a genuinely acceptable alternative to scientific realism. The two main constituents of scientific realism--scientism and critical realism--are then defended in Chapters 3 and 4. Lastly, the superempirical virtues and their role in theory evaluation is discussed in Chapter 5, wherein they are presented as a nonempirical source of quality control on our theorizing.

Identiferoai:union.ndltd.org:LACETR/oai:collectionscanada.gc.ca:QMM.60434
Date January 1990
CreatorsAvilés, Cuauhtémoc
PublisherMcGill University
Source SetsLibrary and Archives Canada ETDs Repository / Centre d'archives des thèses électroniques de Bibliothèque et Archives Canada
LanguageEnglish
Detected LanguageEnglish
TypeElectronic Thesis or Dissertation
Formatapplication/pdf
CoverageMaster of Arts (Department of Philosophy.)
RightsAll items in eScholarship@McGill are protected by copyright with all rights reserved unless otherwise indicated.
Relationalephsysno: 001226115, proquestno: AAIMM67572, Theses scanned by UMI/ProQuest.

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