Mathematical aggregation frameworks are general and precise settings in which to study ways of forming a consensus or group point of view from a set of potentially diverse points of view. Yet the standard frameworks have significant limitations. A number of results show that certain sets of desirable aggregation properties cannot be simultaneously satisfied. Drawing on work in the theory of imprecise probabilities, I propose philosophically-motivated generalizations of the standard aggregation frameworks (for probability, preference, full belief) that I prove can satisfy the desired properties. I then look at some applications and consequences of these proposals in decision theory, epistemology, and the social sciences.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:columbia.edu/oai:academiccommons.columbia.edu:10.7916/D8J67VC0 |
| Date | January 2017 |
| Creators | Stewart, Rush T. |
| Source Sets | Columbia University |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Theses |
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