This dissertation applies modern public choice theories to the United Nations system. Public choice is the study of public sector decision making using basic economic postulates. It attempts to gain insights into the formation and operation of collective organizations by studying the personal incentives faced by the relevant decision-makers. For many years, people have pointed to the apparent failure of international organizations to achieve their goals. The public choice approach offers new insights into the reasons for this failure, and it can also be used to suggest improvements which might enable these organizations to be more successful. / There are several separate, but related, chapters in this dissertation. Chapter 2 analyzes the U.N. Charter and the League of Nations Covenant using the principles of constitutional economics. Chapter 3 analyzes the size and growth of the budgets of the U.N. system. Chapter 4 considers whether the de facto members of GATT, who do not contribute to the budget, are free riders. Chapter 5 looks at the stability of voting coalitions in the U.N. General Assembly from 1946 to 1973. Finally, Chapter 6 looks at the effectiveness of U.N. interventions, such as peacekeeping forces in Lebanon and sanctions against South Africa. This chapter uses exchange rate data to estimate the appreciations (or depreciations) caused by these interventions, and considers those movements a measure of the effectiveness of the policy. / Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 55-03, Section: A, page: 0661. / Major Professor: Randall G. Holcombe. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--The Florida State University, 1994.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:fsu.edu/oai:fsu.digital.flvc.org:fsu_77118 |
| Contributors | Sobel, Russell Steven., Florida State University |
| Source Sets | Florida State University |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Text |
| Format | 235 p. |
| Rights | On campus use only. |
| Relation | Dissertation Abstracts International |
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