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Self-Regulation Mechanisms in the Practice of Information Privacy

Today, many privacy abuses can be traced to the lack of organization policies governing the conduct of the personnel who are in charge of managing the information systems. IT professionals, who are the most important gatekeepers to the information privacy practices, have the oversight responsibility for information privacy since they have the most extensive knowledge of their organization¡¦s systems and data. In this research, we have studied the impact of managerial policies concerning ethical codes and rewards/penalty perception on IS professionals¡¦ self-regulation capacity against privacy abuses.
Specificially, based upon the Moment-of-Truth model and paradigm of self-regulation, we investigated how IS professionals¡¦ ethical judgment, subjective norm, privacy self-efficacy and intention may reciprocally interact with their business environment that was characterized by its use of ethical codes and the rewards/penalty system. We first proposed an ethical dicision model based on the paradigm of self-regulation and validated the appropriateness of this model for studying information privacy. We then demonstrated how the perception of the rewards/penalty may impact the ethical judgment, subjective norm, privacy self-efficay, and ethical intention. We discovered that the rewards/penalty perception had a moderating effect on the relationship between ethical judgment and intention, and that the ethical codes had the moderating effect on the relationship between privacy self-efficacy and intention.

Identiferoai:union.ndltd.org:NSYSU/oai:NSYSU:etd-0621103-123213
Date21 June 2003
CreatorsLin, Hsing-Tzu
ContributorsFeng-Yang Kuo, Hsin-Hui Lin, Tung-Ching Lin, Houn-Gee Chen, none
PublisherNSYSU
Source SetsNSYSU Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Archive
LanguageCholon
Detected LanguageEnglish
Typetext
Formatapplication/pdf
Sourcehttp://etd.lib.nsysu.edu.tw/ETD-db/ETD-search/view_etd?URN=etd-0621103-123213
Rightsoff_campus_withheld, Copyright information available at source archive

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