The general topic of our thesis is forward looking behavior in strategic situations. Mixing theoretical and experimental analysis, we document how strategic thinking is affected by the specific features of a dynamic interaction. The overarching result is that the information regarding decisions that are close to the current one, receive a qualitatively different consideration, with respect to distant ones. That is, the actual decisions are based on reasoning over a limited number of steps, close to actual decison node. We capture this feature of behavior both in a strategic (limited backward induction) and in a non-strategic (limited farsightedness) set up, and we identify relevant consequences on the outcome of the interaction, which powerfullly explain many observed experimental regularities.<p>In the first essay, we present a general out-of-equilibrium framework for strategic thinking in sequential games. It assumes the agents to take decisions on restricted game trees, according to their (limited) foresight level, following backward induction. Therefore we talk of limited backward induction (LBI). We test for LBI using a variant of the race game. Our design allows to identify restricted game trees and backward reasoning, thus properly disentangling LBI behavior. The results provide strong support in favor of LBI. Most players solve intermediate tasks - i.e. restricted games - without reasoning on the terminal histories. Only a small fraction of subjects play close to equilibrium, and (slow) convergence toward it appears, though only in the base game. An intermediate task keeps the subjects off the equilibrium path longer than in the base game. The results cannot be rationalized using the most popular models of strategic reasoning, let alone equilibrium analysis.<p>In the second essay, a subtle implication of the model is investigated: the sensitivity of the players’ foresight to the accessibility and completeness of the information they have, using a Centipede game. By manipulating the way in which information is provided to subjects, we show that reduced availability of information is sufficient to shift the distribution of take-nodes further from the equilibrium prediction. On the other hand, similar results are obtained in a treatment where reduced availability of information is combined with an attempt to elicit preferences for reciprocity, through the presentation of the centipede as a repeated trust game. Our results could be interpreted as cognitive limitations being more effective than preferences in determining (shifts in) behavior in our experimental centipede. Furthermore our results are at odds with the recent ones in Cox [2012], suggesting caution in generalizing their results. Reducing the availability of information may hamper backward induction or induce myopic behavior, depending on the strategic environment.<p>The third essay consists of an experimental investigation of farsighted versus myopic behavior in network formation. Pairwise stability Jackson and Wolinsky [1996] is the standard stability concept in network formation. It assumes myopic behavior of the agents in the sense that they do not forecast how others might react to their actions. Assuming that agents are perfectly farsighted, related stability concepts have been proposed. We design a simple network formation experiment to test these extreme theories, but find evidence against both of them: the subjects are consistent with an intermediate rule of behavior, which we interpret as a form of limited farsightedness. On aggregate, the selection among multiple pairwise stable networks (and the performance of farsighted stability) crucially depends on the level of farsightedness needed to sustain them, and not on efficiency or cooperative considerations. Individual behavior analysis corroborates this interpretation, and suggests, in general, a low level of farsightedness (around two steps) on the part of the agents. / Doctorat en Sciences économiques et de gestion / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:ulb.ac.be/oai:dipot.ulb.ac.be:2013/209492 |
| Date | 09 May 2013 |
| Creators | Mantovani, Marco |
| Contributors | Filippin, Antonio, Kirchsteiger, Georg, Guala, Francesco, Riedl, Arno, Iriberri, Nagore, De Rock, Bram |
| Publisher | Universite Libre de Bruxelles, Université libre de Bruxelles, Faculté Solvay Brussels School of Economics and Management, Bruxelles |
| Source Sets | Université libre de Bruxelles |
| Language | French |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | info:eu-repo/semantics/doctoralThesis, info:ulb-repo/semantics/doctoralThesis, info:ulb-repo/semantics/openurl/vlink-dissertation |
| Format | 1 v. (118 p.), No full-text files |
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