This study examines the propensity of internally weak states to form alliances with or against threatening powers. Drawing upon insights from neoclassical realism, the study proposes a 'resistance' model of weak state alliance formation and tests the model using cases drawn from the states of the former Soviet Union. The study examined the performance of resistance theory explanations when compared to explanations drawn from the dominant theory of alliance formation, Balance of Threat, as well as a generally accepted theory of weak state alliances, Capitulationist theory The study finds that the leaders of weak states are particularly susceptible to the influence of 'critical constituencies' within their states---those social and political forces upon which weak regimes most depend for continued authority. The reliance of weak leaders on these narrow segments of society often precludes alliances with threatening external powers whose demands are at odds with the values of the critical constituency Ultimately, internally weak states were found to be no more willing to be coerced into binding alliance agreements than were similarly threatened states with greater levels of internal cohesion. This finding was inconsistent with Capitulationist theory, consistent with Balance of Threat but best explained by resistance theory / acase@tulane.edu
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:TULANE/oai:http://digitallibrary.tulane.edu/:tulane_25533 |
| Date | January 2011 |
| Contributors | McLellan, Edward Alden, III (Author), Fettweis, Christopher J (Thesis advisor) |
| Publisher | Tulane University |
| Source Sets | Tulane University |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Rights | Access requires a license to the Dissertations and Theses (ProQuest) database., Copyright is in accordance with U.S. Copyright law |
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