It is the argument of this dissertation that states become tax havens as a conscious economic development strategy. These states – more properly referred to as "jurisdictions" because some lack the sovereignty of the traditional Westphalian state – do not have the natural resources or the population to pursue more traditional economic development strategies, but they do have the ability to write or implement laws that create a virtual resource: banking secrecy. These jurisdictions are able to carry out this strategy because they tend to be well-governed, stable, and relatively wealthy, making them attractive partners for the international banking, legal, and accounting firms that drive offshore finance, and then for their customers – both individual and corporate – as well. The qualities tax havens possess also enable them to calculate that the benefits they reap from pursuing this strategy outweigh any penalties assessed by anti-tax haven international collective action activities, such as the naming and shaming campaigns of 2000.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:uky.edu/oai:uknowledge.uky.edu:polysci_etds-1023 |
| Date | 01 January 2018 |
| Creators | Dainoff, Charles A. |
| Publisher | UKnowledge |
| Source Sets | University of Kentucky |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Source | Theses and Dissertations--Political Science |
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