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Ambiguous tipping points

We analyze the policy implications of aversion to Knightian uncertainty (ambiguity) about the possibility of tipping points. We demonstrate two channels through which uncertainty aversion affects optimal policy in the general setting. The first channel relates to the policy's effect on the probability of tipping, and the second channel to its differential impact in the pre- and post-tipping regimes. We then extend a recursive dynamic model of climate policy and tipping points to include uncertainty aversion. Numerically, aversion to Knightian uncertainty in the face of an ambiguous tipping point increases the optimal tax on carbon dioxide emissions, but only by a small amount.

Identiferoai:union.ndltd.org:arizona.edu/oai:arizona.openrepository.com:10150/622659
Date12 1900
CreatorsLemoine, Derek, Traeger, Christian P.
ContributorsDepartment of Economics, University of Arizona
PublisherELSEVIER SCIENCE BV
Source SetsUniversity of Arizona
LanguageEnglish
Detected LanguageEnglish
TypeArticle
Rights© 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Relationhttp://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0167268116300221

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