This dissertation consists of three essays on microeconomics. The first two are theoretical papers that address issues in collective decision-making. The last is an experimental paper that explores gender differences in test-taking strategies. In the first essay, we define a family of social choice rules that depend on the population’s preferences and on the probability distribution over the sets of feasible alternatives that the society will face. Our rules can be interpreted as distance-minimization – selecting the order closest to the population’s preferences, using a metric on the orders that reflects the distribution over the possible feasible sets. The distance is the probability that two orders will disagree about the optimal choice from a randomly-selected available set. In the second essay, we study representative democracy and contrast it with direct democracy. The key question is whether representative democracy, with its practical advantages, succeeds in implementing the choices that the group would make under the more normatively attractive direct democracy. We find that, in general, it does not. We analyze the theoretical setting in which the two methods are most likely to lead to the same choices, minimizing potential sources of distortion. We show that even in this case, where the normative recommendation of direct democracy is clear, representative democracy may not elect the candidate with this ordering. In the third essay, we present the results of an experiment that explores whether women skip more questions than men on multiple-choice tests. The experimental test consists of practice questions from SAT II subject tests; we vary the size of the penalty imposed for a wrong answer and the salience of the evaluative nature of the task. We find that when no penalty is assessed for a wrong answer, all test-takers answer every question. But, when there is a small penalty for wrong answers and the task is explicitly framed as an SAT, women answer significantly fewer questions than men. We show that, conditional on their knowledge of the material, test-takers who skip questions do significantly worse on our experimental test, putting women and more risk averse test-takers at a disadvantage. / Economics
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:harvard.edu/oai:dash.harvard.edu:1/10336881 |
| Date | January 2012 |
| Creators | Baldiga, Katherine |
| Contributors | Green, Jerry R. |
| Publisher | Harvard University |
| Source Sets | Harvard University |
| Language | en_US |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Thesis or Dissertation |
| Rights | closed access |
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