Cooperation in joint enterprises poses a social dilemma. How can altruistic behavior be sustained if selfish alternatives provide a higher payoff? This social dilemma can be overcome by the threat of sanctions. But a sanctioning system is itself a public good and poses a second-order social dilemma. In this paper, we show by means of deterministic and stochastic evolutionary game theory that imitation-driven evolution can lead to the emergence of cooperation based on punishment, provided the participation in the joint enterprise is not compulsory. This surprising result - cooperation can be enforced if participation is voluntary - holds even in the case of 'strong altruism', when the benefits of a player's contribution are reaped by the other participants only. (authors' abstract)
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:VIENNA/oai:epub.wu-wien.ac.at:5149 |
| Date | 04 1900 |
| Creators | De Silva, Hannelore, Hauert, Christoph, Traulsen, Arne, Sigmund, Karl |
| Publisher | Springer Berlin Heidelberg |
| Source Sets | Wirtschaftsuniversität Wien |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Article, PeerReviewed |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Rights | Creative Commons: Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International (CC BY-NC 4.0) |
| Relation | http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00191-009-0162-8, http://link.springer.com/journal/191, http://www.springer.com/de/open-access/springer-open-choice, http://epub.wu.ac.at/5149/ |
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