The dissertation consists of two essays. In the first essay we study the efficiency of banks during the period of (2000-2017) that witnessed a fierce financial crisis in the light of the regulatory acts enacted in response to the crisis (Basel III 2010). We investigate the combined impact of compliance with Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital, common equity Tier 1, and leverage requirements on bank operating efficiency. We measure operational efficiency of 68 insured, U.S. federally and state-chartered, commercial banks, with consolidated assets of $15 billion or more, over a sampling period of 18 years. We seek to identify whether different dimensions of bank regulation are efficient in stabilizing US financial system by improving efficiency of large commercial banks; whether they impede bank efficiency by limiting its risk-taking endeavors and tightening its capital usage; or whether no impact on efficiency exists altogether. We build an empirical model measuring the impact of capital and leverage regulation and credit risk on banks’ operational efficiency. Empirical findings show a positive and statistically significant impact of capital adequacy on operating efficiency of large U.S. commercial banks, with common equity Tier 1 having more power in determining efficiency. Leverage requirements and net charge-offs are also found to be significant determinants that promote bank operating efficiency. In the second essay we investigate determinants for government’s choice of sovereign Sukuk over conventional bonds. Using a sample of 143 sovereign Sukuk and 602 sovereign conventional bonds issued in 16 OIC countries during (2000-2015), we analyze factors affecting the government's choice of employing sovereign Sukuk structure as substitute to sovereign bonds instruments. Results suggest that countries having developed financial markets, higher credit quality, and strong economic and financial prospects are more likely to issue sovereign Sukuk rather than sovereign bonds, mainly as a strategy to diversify and develop their current debt markets by introducing newly-developed debt tools. However, countries with weaker economic and financial indicators are more likely to opt for the classic sovereign bonds. We conclude that government’s choice of sovereign debt is mainly determined by a country’s financial characteristics, macroeconomic indicators and certain specific events.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:uno.edu/oai:scholarworks.uno.edu:td-3783 |
| Date | 23 May 2019 |
| Creators | boujlil, rhada |
| Publisher | ScholarWorks@UNO |
| Source Sets | University of New Orleans |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Source | University of New Orleans Theses and Dissertations |
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