This thesis examines firm performance through the dot-com bubble through the lens of executive compensation. Hypotheses based on the theoretical literature of Bolton, Scheinkman and Xiong (2006) as well as Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) in regards to management compensation in a speculative bubble motivate three regression models with differing market-cap-growth based dependent variables and specific compensation variables. Regression analyses test the models using public compensation and security data from S&P's Execucomp and Compustat databases. Synthesizing regression results show that stock option vesting schedules and executives' status on the board of directors may significantly affect firm performance through the dot-com bubble, but more analysis, using more robust data, is necessary to verify either claim.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:CLAREMONT/oai:scholarship.claremont.edu:cmc_theses-1422 |
| Date | 01 January 2012 |
| Creators | Chambers, Maxwell J. |
| Publisher | Scholarship @ Claremont |
| Source Sets | Claremont Colleges |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Source | CMC Senior Theses |
| Rights | © 2012 Maxwell J. Chambers |
Page generated in 0.0021 seconds