During the past two decades, it was witness a dramatic global shift in economic policy away from state-owned enterprises (SOEs) towards privatization. Since privatization improves incentives, a rapid transfer of ownership and control right should be desirable. In Taiwan, the Executive Yuan of the government organized a group to promote privatization in 1989 and the officers then took the initiative to carry out the privatization program enthusiastically.
By classifying the privatization process into two stages, we analyzed the effect of different stock floatation schedules, different underwriting mechanisms, and different levels of government intervention on ownership structure and corporate governance. Based on the model inference, we found that when maximizing stock floating revenue, wider share ownership, and promoting the SOEs¡¦ efficiency, a sequential transfer of ownership and control right should be better than privatized instantaneously. Under the same goals, the mechanism with partial public offering and partial auction was better than the mechanism with partial public offering and partial book building. Finally, it was not optimal for government to intervene the operating of SOEs after privatization.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:NSYSU/oai:NSYSU:etd-0206101-160908 |
| Date | 06 February 2001 |
| Creators | Chiang, Sue-Jane |
| Contributors | Yue-Shan Chang, None, none, Victor Wei-Chi Liu, none |
| Publisher | NSYSU |
| Source Sets | NSYSU Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Archive |
| Language | Cholon |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Source | http://etd.lib.nsysu.edu.tw/ETD-db/ETD-search/view_etd?URN=etd-0206101-160908 |
| Rights | off_campus_withheld, Copyright information available at source archive |
Page generated in 0.002 seconds