TESIS PARA OPTAR AL GRADO DE MAGÍSTER EN ECONOMÍA / Data from Chile's public procurement system shows that auctions become less competitive toward
the end of the scal year as the number of tenders increases because of use-it-or-lose-it budget provisions.
A dynamic price-competition model with capacity constraints rationalizes this nding and has additional predictions
that are con rmed by the data. In particular, rms infer a less competitive environment by the end
of the year and frequently set their bids around the price cap. This result is driven by the possibility of
becoming a single-bidder when competitors exhaust their capacity. Additionally, high-capacity rms usually
skew their victories toward the end of the year, while smaller rms win more tenders in earlier periods.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:UCHILE/oai:repositorio.uchile.cl:2250/164083 |
| Date | 01 1900 |
| Creators | Karnani, Mohit |
| Contributors | Engel Goetz, Eduardo |
| Publisher | Universidad de Chile |
| Source Sets | Universidad de Chile |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Tesis |
| Rights | Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Chile, http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/cl/ |
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