My investigation of pleasures involved in an Aristotelian temperate action starts with Aristotle’s account of health presented in Metaphysics, Physics, and his other biological works. Aristotle’s conception of health provides the theoretical backdrop in which two modes of temperate action concerning bodily pleasures involving appetite and pain are made possible. The temperate person is capable of acting temperately because the rational part of the human soul can influence appetite, and the contact between the pleasant and what is good for health allows two possible ways of action. When the pleasure of appetite is within the range of what is good for health or does not harm health, temperate people may pursue it; when the two do not match, a temperate action does not involve any bodily pleasures, and is simply the activity of the rational soul. This thesis emphasizes the second mode of temperate action, since this type of temperate action simply consists in the activity of the rational soul, specifically, acting out the deliberate decision of avoidance. / Thesis / Master of Arts (MA) / In Aristotle’s ethical theory, the virtue of temperance is related to two types of pleasures. One type is the bodily pleasures involving appetite and pain, the other is the pleasure following upon a temperate action. My examination of his conception of health reveals that, in acting temperately, temperate people experience the second type of pleasure in their abstinence from the enjoyment of the first type of pleasures.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:mcmaster.ca/oai:macsphere.mcmaster.ca:11375/23731 |
| Date | January 2018 |
| Creators | Allen, Jeanne |
| Contributors | Johnstone, Mark, Classics |
| Source Sets | McMaster University |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Thesis |
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