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Pay for laziness: why incentive pay for teachers may fail when students can go to private tutoring?.

Li, Ho Ming. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2011. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 16-18). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Chapter 1 --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter 1.1 --- Related literature --- p.1 / Chapter 1.2 --- Background --- p.3 / Chapter 2 --- The model --- p.4 / Chapter 2.1 --- Set up --- p.4 / Chapter 2.2 --- The rationale for performance pay --- p.6 / Chapter 2.3 --- Performance pay with private tutoring --- p.7 / Chapter 2.4 --- Good teacher is not less susceptible --- p.8 / Chapter 2.5 --- Effect of the decreasing tutoring fee --- p.9 / Chapter 3 --- Conclusion --- p.10 / Chapter 4 --- References --- p.12 / Chapter 5 --- Appendix --- p.18 / Chapter 5.1 --- Tables showing bonus schemes across states --- p.18 / Chapter 5.2 --- Derivation for Proposition 1 --- p.18 / Chapter 5.3 --- Numerical example for Proposition 1 --- p.18 / Chapter 5.4 --- Derivation for Proposition 3 --- p.19 / Chapter 5.5 --- Numerical example for Proposition 3 --- p.19

Identiferoai:union.ndltd.org:cuhk.edu.hk/oai:cuhk-dr:cuhk_327503
Date January 2011
ContributorsLi, Ho Ming., Chinese University of Hong Kong Graduate School. Division of Economics.
Source SetsThe Chinese University of Hong Kong
LanguageEnglish, Chinese
Detected LanguageEnglish
TypeText, bibliography
Formatprint, iii, 24 leaves : ill. ; 30 cm.
CoverageUnited States, United States
RightsUse of this resource is governed by the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons “Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International” License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/)

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