<p>Technological systems
contain complex elements and processes with a diverse set of agents and
problem-solving arrangements. They often interact with and influence
multi-lateral stakeholders with varying interests and incentives. Recent technological
developments and engineering advancements such as digital marketplaces and
high-tech networks create both new challenges and opportunities to understand
further about effective mechanism designs. This dissertation attempts to answer
corporate-level mechanism design issues in two different technological systems:
high-tech biopharmaceutical networks and the online peer-to-peer lending
industry.</p><p><br></p><p>The
first part of the dissertation focuses on identifying the emergence and
evolution of near decomposable systems in interorganizational relationships. To
do so, first I conceptually discuss how near decomposable systems can emerge in
interfirm relationships. Second, leveraging advancements in network science, I
empirically analyze a detailed biopharmaceutical alliance data set and find
that strategic alliance networks of biopharmaceutical firms exhibit near
decomposable characteristics. I identify an emerging evolutionary pattern with
smaller networks of subcommunities organizing hierarchically over time into a
larger network structure, with the subcommunities generally exhibiting local
clustering. A salient finding, compared to previous studies in the field of
strategic management, is the identification of nested clusters formed in
hierarchical fashion within this interfirm network. I find the potential for
simultaneous evolutionary processes to be in play in various subnetworks within
the overall industry-level network. The accrual of local changes impacting the
structural processes of the subnetworks slowly diffuses to the larger, less integrated
modules of the network. Finally, with the help of a simulation model, I
identify how fitness heterogeneity among firms, fitness heterogeneity among
partnerships and the rate of growth of partnerships impact the emergence of
near decomposability in varying degrees.</p><p><br></p><p>The
second study focuses on understanding an important market access control
mechanism: platform owners granting priority access to a subset of supply-side
complementors to grow the marketplace and remove potential demand-side
bottlenecks. Platform governance mechanisms, such as market access control,
help to align all market players towards a specific value proposition. I study
the interplay between priority access and the variation in expertise of the complementors.
Leveraging a randomized priority access given to expert institutional investors
in the online peer-to-peer lending industry, I show that it creates negative
spillover effects on the performance of crowd retail investors. I provide
evidence in support of two mechanisms in driving the impact of priority access,
the intensity of priority access and cream skimming by institutional complementors,
on the retail crowd market. Again using simulation to extend the analysis, I
find that the brunt of negative impacts is likely borne by more risk-averse
retail investors.</p>
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:purdue.edu/oai:figshare.com:article/15019377 |
| Date | 19 July 2021 |
| Creators | Anparasan Mahalingam (6922799) |
| Source Sets | Purdue University |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Text, Thesis |
| Rights | CC BY 4.0 |
| Relation | https://figshare.com/articles/thesis/Mechanism_Design_Issues_in_Technological_Systems/15019377 |
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