At last, this study examines the welfare effects of export share requirement in a less developed country (LDC) with foreign investment, labour unemployment (or underemployment) and imperfect competition in its importable sector. In the quota case, introducing export share requirement always benefits a Harris-Todaro or Lewis' economy irrespective of free or restricted entry of local rivals. The policy unambiguously dampens the domestic price of imported goods, expands the importable sector, reduces labour unemployment (or underemployment) and improves national welfare. When free entry and exit of domestic players are allowed, the policy also induces emergence of local rivals. The LDC should always impose 100% export share requirement on foreign investment for attaining maximal welfare. / This dissertation consists of three independent essays on international trade policies. First of all, this dissertation provides a general equilibrium model on a small economy for examining the individual as well as the joint effects of pollution tax and equity share restrictions on the investment from multinational corporations (MNCs). The results show that free trade, free capital flow and the Pigouvian tax (i.e. at a rate equal to the marginal damage of pollution) is the first-best policy for the host country. Should imports be subject to irremovable tariff, the second-best policy is 100% foreign ownership of MNC subsidiaries, coupled with pollution tax higher than the Pigouvian rate. Allowing wholly foreign-owned subsidiaries and taxing pollution less than the Pigouvian rate is the second-best option for an economy adopting quantitative restriction policies. In particular, if quota is adopted by the host country, who retains all the trade restriction rent, the second best policy mix will be the Pigouvian tax and allowing full foreign ownership of MNC subsidiaries. / We then proceed to a game theoretic model to investigate how an industrialized country serves the market of a host country by transferring its technology to the host country's importable sector, and how the host country government reacts by means of export share requirement to optimize its national welfare. The interaction between the host country and the technology-exporting country has been modeled as a non-cooperative game. In the simultaneous-move framework, we have derived the existence of Nash equilibrium. The export of technology should earn a positive royalty, and the host country mandates some portion of importable good produced by foreign firms for export. The effects of raising tariff on importable good and importing more capital-intensive technology are also investigated. In addition, the sub-game perfect equilibria of two possible sequential-move frameworks have also been formulated. / Tai Chi-hung. / "December 1999." / Adviser: Eden S. H. Yu. / Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 61-08, Section: A, page: 3296. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1999. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 95-99). / Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, MI : ProQuest dissertations and theses, [200-] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / School code: 1307.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:cuhk.edu.hk/oai:cuhk-dr:cuhk_342905 |
| Date | January 2000 |
| Contributors | Tai, Chi-hung., Chinese University of Hong Kong Graduate School. Division of Business Administration. |
| Source Sets | The Chinese University of Hong Kong |
| Language | English, Chinese |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Text, theses |
| Format | electronic resource, microform, microfiche, 1 online resource (vii, 99 p.) |
| Rights | Use of this resource is governed by the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons “Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International” License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/) |
Page generated in 0.002 seconds