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On the Impossibility of an Exact Imperfect Monitoring Folk Theorem

Submitted by Carlos Oliveira (carlos.oliveira@fgv.br) on 2008-05-15T19:13:34Z
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Previous issue date: 2007 / It is shown that, for almost every two-player game with imperfect monitoring, the conclusions of the classical folk theorem are false. So, even though these games admit a well-known approximate folk theorem, an exact folk theorem may only be obtained for a measure zero set of games. A complete characterization of the efficient equilibria of almost every such game is also given, along with an inefficiency result on the imperfect monitoring prisoner s dilemma.

Identiferoai:union.ndltd.org:IBICT/oai:bibliotecadigital.fgv.br:10438/1616
Date29 June 2007
CreatorsAzevedo, Eduardo Monteiro de
ContributorsCarrasco, Vinícius, Krishna, Vijay, Maduro, Paulo, Mas-Colell, Andreu, Morris, Stephen, Escolas::EPGE, FGV, Araújo, Aloísio Pessoa de
Source SetsIBICT Brazilian ETDs
LanguageEnglish
Detected LanguageEnglish
Typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion, info:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesis
Sourcereponame:Repositório Institucional do FGV, instname:Fundação Getulio Vargas, instacron:FGV
Rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess

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