The main purpose of the present study is to show that scientific realism is still worth advocating despite its vulnerability in the face of anti-realist objections. For, it does not seem possible to &lsquo / do science&rsquo / without realist commitments. The second purpose of this study is to investigate the plausibility of the novel versions of realism in the sense that whether they can satisfactorily respond to the anti-realist objections. Regarding the main purpose, I try to show that theoretical terms are neither reducible to observables nor they can be dispensed with. Hence in scientific theories there always remains a metaphysical part. Regarding the second purpose I discuss ontic structural realism which holds the individualistic attributions responsible for the metaphysical parts in theories and suggests that non-individualistic interpretation of theoretical terms is possible. The legitimacy of Ontic structural realism&rsquo / s suggestion, as its advocates claim, lies within quantum facts.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:METU/oai:etd.lib.metu.edu.tr:http://etd.lib.metu.edu.tr/upload/12611415/index.pdf |
| Date | 01 December 2009 |
| Creators | Kaya, Nevzat |
| Contributors | Bagce, Samet |
| Publisher | METU |
| Source Sets | Middle East Technical Univ. |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | M.A. Thesis |
| Format | text/pdf |
| Rights | To liberate the content for public access |
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