It seems well accepted that agents can only be morally responsible for what they voluntarily control. Yet as a matter of practice, we seem to hold agents responsible for items outside of their voluntary control, blaming others for failing to notice certain features of their environment, for having certain attitudes, or for forgetting to fulfill a promise. There is an apparent tension between philosophical theory and everyday practice. One way to explain away this tension is by appealing to a distinction between direct and derivative responsibility. When an agent S is responsible for something, X, in virtue of being responsible for something else that does not include X, Y, then S is derivatively responsible for X. When S is responsible for X but not solely in virtue of being responsible for some other thing, Y, S is directly responsible for X. One might argue that to be directly responsible for some item, one must have voluntary control over it. We are, at best, derivatively responsible for items over which we lack voluntary control, such as nonvoluntary attitudes. If we can trace back to a point at which an agent had voluntary control over some behavior and was aware of the potential nonvoluntary item that might result, the agent could be derivatively responsible for that item. Theorists who opt to relieve the tension in this way are called volitionists. They insist that voluntary control is required for direct responsibility. Recently, however, several theorists, called nonvolitionists, have denied that voluntary control is required for direct responsibility. Instead, they claim, agents can be directly responsible for nonvoluntary attitudes and other items over which they lack voluntary control. In this dissertation, I begin to assess the motivation for and merits of such nonvolitionist views. In chapter 2, I attempt to precisely articulate a volitionist thesis, which is more difficult than volitionists and nonvolitionists have yet appreciated. I argue that there are substantial problems with understanding the volitionist thesis as the claim that one is directly responsible only for what is under one’s voluntary control. Rather than formulating the volitionist thesis in this way, as others have done, I suggest that it is clearer and more useful to understand the volitionist thesis as the claim that agents are directly responsible only for their intentional actions. The volitionist thesis I offer in chapter 2 does not include direct responsibility for many omissions. While volitionists might want to amend this volitionist thesis to include these omissions, I argue in chapter 3 that they cannot do so in a justified way. If volitionists cannot comfortably extend direct responsibility to include omissions, they must account for these items derivatively via some kind of tracing strategy. In chapter 4, I argue that there are problems with proposed epistemic conditions on derivative responsibility, and some nonvoluntary faults—especially negligence and certain omissions—will prove quite difficult, if not impossible, for the tracing strategy. Accounting for responsibility for some nonvoluntary faults either directly or derivatively might be much more difficult for volitionists than they have previously appreciated. In light of this difficulty in matching our everyday responsibility ascriptions and practices, we should entertain nonvolitionist accounts. The second half of the dissertation explores the plausibility of nonvolitionism. In chapter 5, I explain and defend one of the current leading nonvolitionist accounts: Angela Smith’s rational relations view (RRV). RRV holds that agents can be directly responsible for their attitudes in virtue of a rational connection between such attitudes and the judgments and values that underlie them. The second half of chapter 5 as well as chapter 6 are devoted to defending RRV against various objections, including a recent criticism from Neil Levy. Levy argues that direct responsibility requires consciousness of the moral significance of one’s behavior. I argue that Levy fails to establish such consciousness as necessary for direct responsibility, and then offer some revisions to the rational relations view that might help to mitigate Levy’s worries. This modified version of RRV, which I call the rational control view (RCV), is thus poised to be a viable alternative to volitionist views. In chapter 7, I explain and defend RCV. My conclusion is modest: RCV is a serious and legitimate contender to volitionist views in light of the problems I highlight in the first several chapters. As such, RCV is worth developing further as we search for the best account of how and why agents are morally responsible for not only intentional actions, but also omissions and attitudes. / A Dissertation submitted to the Department of Philosophy in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. / Summer Semester 2016. / June 17, 2016. / Blameworthiness, Control, Moral Responsibility, Nonvolitionism, Volitionism, Voluntary Control / Includes bibliographical references. / Randolph Clarke, Professor Directing Dissertation; Martin Kavka, University Representative; Alfred R. Mele, Committee Member; Piers Rawling, Committee Member.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:fsu.edu/oai:fsu.digital.flvc.org:fsu_366060 |
| Contributors | Fritz, Kyle G. (Kyle Gregory) (authoraut), Clarke, Randolph K. (professor directing dissertation), Kavka, Martin (university representative), Mele, Alfred R., 1951- (committee member), Rawling, J. Piers (committee member), Florida State University (degree granting institution), College of Arts and Sciences (degree granting college), Department of Philosophy (degree granting department) |
| Publisher | Florida State University, Florida State University |
| Source Sets | Florida State University |
| Language | English, English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Text, text |
| Format | 1 online resource (165 pages), computer, application/pdf |
| Rights | This Item is protected by copyright and/or related rights. You are free to use this Item in any way that is permitted by the copyright and related rights legislation that applies to your use. For other uses you need to obtain permission from the rights-holder(s). The copyright in theses and dissertations completed at Florida State University is held by the students who author them. |
Page generated in 0.0023 seconds