This thesis seeks to provide an extensive theoretical framework for the potential incentive effects from debt relief. The objective is achieved by integrating the positive incentive model by Krugman with a negative incentive framework developed by drawing on the theories of a soft budget constraint. The analysis shows that the existence of bailouts offers the possibility that debt relief can produce negative incentives for the debtor instead of positive incentives for improved performance. Taking on a game theoretical perspective suggests that strategic behavior in the interaction between the debtor and the creditor can increase the likelihood of a specific incentive effect to prevail. Such an interactive game also highlights the importance for the creditor to obtain reliable information about the behavior of the debtor.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:UPSALLA1/oai:DiVA.org:uu-6394 |
| Date | January 2006 |
| Creators | Larnemark, Martin |
| Publisher | Uppsala universitet, Nationalekonomiska institutionen, Uppsala : Nationalekonomiska institutionen |
| Source Sets | DiVA Archive at Upsalla University |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Student thesis, info:eu-repo/semantics/bachelorThesis, text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
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