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Constitutionalism and judicial appointment as a means of safeguarding judicial independence in selected African jurisdictions

The beginning of the 1990s saw many African countries embarking on the process of drafting
new constitutions as they abandoned independence constitutions. Most of the independence
constitutions were perceived as constitutions without constitutionalism and they were
generally blamed for failure of democracy and the rule of law in Africa.
The study analyses the state of democracy and constitutionalism and the impact that
colonialism had on the African continent. Apart from the spurt of new constitutions adopted,
democracy is growing very slowly in most African states with widespread human rights
violations and disregard for the rule of law and the principle of separation of powers, still
holding the centre stage.
Judicial independence is an important component of democracy in the modern state. The
study therefore scrutinizes how the principle of judicial independence can be promoted and
protected to enhance democracy. One important mechanism which plays a crucial role in
safeguarding judicial independence is the way judicial officers are appointed. The study
selects four countries – Swaziland, Kenya, Zimbabwe and South Africa and analyses how
judicial officers are appointed in these countries in an effort to find an effective and optimal
approach.The premise of the study is centred on the role of constitutionalism and the process of
appointing judges as a means of promoting and safeguarding democracy in these selected
countries. / Public, Constitutional, & International Law / LLM

Identiferoai:union.ndltd.org:netd.ac.za/oai:union.ndltd.org:unisa/oai:umkn-dsp01.int.unisa.ac.za:10500/11980
Date11 1900
CreatorsMakama, Saul Porsche
ContributorsBotha, N. J. (Neville John), 1951-
Source SetsSouth African National ETD Portal
LanguageEnglish
Detected LanguageEnglish
TypeDissertation
Format1 online resource (x, 185 leaves)

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