One of the hot topics in doxastic epistemology at the moment is how to characterise the
relationship between beliefs and truth. The extant literature is dominated by two views; a
teleological understanding of the relationship – championed by people such as Asbjørn
Steglich-Petersen – and a normative understanding of the relationship – championed by among
others Nishi Shah. I argue that neither view does an adequate job of capturing the relationship
between beliefs and truth. I argue that these two views should be abandoned in favour of a third
model that sees beliefs as part of a doxastic system that aims at rationality.
Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:netd.ac.za/oai:union.ndltd.org:wits/oai:wiredspace.wits.ac.za:10539/14805 |
Date | 19 June 2014 |
Creators | Viedge, Nikolai |
Source Sets | South African National ETD Portal |
Language | English |
Detected Language | English |
Type | Thesis |
Format | application/pdf, application/pdf |
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