Using a set of 4708 observations, we analyze the impact of Dodd-Frank on shifting cases from federal courts to administrative courts. Overall, we find that there is a higher probability of a case being an administrative proceeding post Dodd-Frank. In addition, we find a higher average total payment for administrative proceedings post Dodd-Frank, and a lower average total payment for federal court cases post Dodd-Frank. We also find a higher average disgorgement payment for administrative proceedings post Dodd-Frank. While this finding could be the result of the SEC shifting more complex and thus higher paying cases from federal courts to its own, we find that the SEC is not shifting cases strictly away from federal courts that have the highest average payments. Higher average disgorgement payments are simply the result of the SEC litigating more cases with higher average payments in general. Lastly, we find a higher probability of settling for administrative proceedings overall. However, settlement rates for administrative proceedings decrease post Dodd-Frank. This finding reflects an overall decrease in the SEC’s “home court” advantage and undermines the argument that the SEC is shifting weaker cases to its own courts.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:CLAREMONT/oai:scholarship.claremont.edu:cmc_theses-3168 |
| Date | 01 January 2019 |
| Creators | Grobecker, Reeve |
| Publisher | Scholarship @ Claremont |
| Source Sets | Claremont Colleges |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Source | CMC Senior Theses |
| Rights | Reeve O Grobecker, default |
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