<p>Previous research has analyzed a range of domestic
stakeholders that make national governments’ commitments to international human
rights treaties credible, including independent judiciary, legislative veto
players, political opposition groups, and non-governmental organizations. But
how does the power dynamics within the government affect state compliance with
human rights treaties? In this study, I focus on the effect of the
central-local governmental structure. My focus on the central-local
governmental relations builds on the basic understanding that international
human rights norms need to pass through domestic political and administrative
processes before they can be implemented on the ground. I argue that a
decentralized state in which local authorities enjoy more discretion in local
matters is less likely to comply with human rights treaties because
decentralization (1) hinders the top-down diffusion of human rights norms
between different governmental tiers, (2) creates a great number of local
agents that are not subject to pressure from the international society, and (3)
enables the central government to deflect international criticism by shifting
blame for human rights abuses to local officials. To test my theoretical
expectation, I use a mixed methods approach to analyze variation at both the
national and subnational levels. I first conduct cross-national analyses of the
impact of governmental decentralization on state compliance with the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the United Nations
Convention Against Torture. I then use qualitative and quantitative methods to conduct
subnational analyses of China and US compliance with international human rights
treaties. Complementary streams of quantitative and qualitative evidence from
cross-national and within-country analyses suggest that higher levels of
decentralization reduce state compliance with international human rights
treaties. A practical implication of my research is that failing to hold local
authorities accountable creates a mismatch between promoting political
accountability and advancing human rights.</p>
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:purdue.edu/oai:figshare.com:article/12153135 |
| Date | 20 April 2020 |
| Creators | Mintao Nie (8732571) |
| Source Sets | Purdue University |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Text, Thesis |
| Rights | CC BY 4.0 |
| Relation | https://figshare.com/articles/Agents_of_Recalcitrance_Governmental_Decentralization_and_State_Compliance_with_International_Human_Rights_Treaties/12153135 |
Page generated in 0.0021 seconds