Since the 1970s, the number and variety of states providing bilateral aid has grown. In 1973, 16 states provided aid; in 2013, 31 provided aid. This growth may not appear substantial, but it greatly outstrips growth in the number of states in the international system over the same time period (~46% versus 94%). Given states commit aid for a variety of reasons – prominently, including their own geopolitical self-interests – this growth in the bilateral aid donor community suggests donors are likely to encounter increased competition for any given recipient’s foreign policy cooperation. In the face of this increased competition, this dissertation asks: under what conditions will some bilateral aid donors experience greater foreign policy cooperation as a result of their aid efforts than other donors? To answer this question, this dissertation develops and contributes a framework for better understanding when bilateral donors – in the context of a competitive aid-for-policy "marketplace" – will experience greater geopolitical gain.
The donor-recipient aid and cooperation framework suggests each component of the aid-for-policy exchange – the donor, the recipient, and the aid itself – is likely to influence the success any given donor experiences utilizing aid to promote foreign policy cooperation. At its core, the framework argues any given donor’s ability to use aid to promote foreign policy cooperation is a function of their own decision-making and policy process; in particular, their abilities to interpret information and adjust policies. This function, however, is likely to be conditioned by the recipient’s set of donor relationships, the donor's ability to overcome friction and resistance in their policy process, and the on-the-ground experience of the aid’s consumers. In developing this argument, the donor-recipient aid and cooperation framework draws upon a variety of theories from international relations, foreign policy decision-making, public policy, and organization theory.
Overall, I find elements related to the donor and the recipient condition the success any given donor experiences utilizing aid to promote foreign policy cooperation. The results indicate that donors who possess dependence-based power advantages, or higher levels of mutual dependence, with their recipients are likely to experience improved foreign policy cooperation, but this experience substantively varies across different levels of aid giving. Additionally, some donors – due to their power status, regime type, or organizational memberships and normative adherences – are likely to experience more cooperation than others as a result of lower decision costs and institutional costs in their policy processes. The third element of the donor-recipient aid and cooperation framework, the aid itself, remains untested and is left for analysis in future work.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:arizona.edu/oai:arizona.openrepository.com:10150/625462 |
| Date | January 2017 |
| Creators | Bezerra, Paul Anthony, Bezerra, Paul Anthony |
| Contributors | Volgy, Thomas J., Volgy, Thomas J., Braithwaite, Alex, Ghosn, Faten |
| Publisher | The University of Arizona. |
| Source Sets | University of Arizona |
| Language | en_US |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | text, Electronic Dissertation |
| Rights | Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author. |
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