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United States foreign assistance diplomacy : Congressional policy on aid to Vietnam, 1952-1963

American foreign assistance to the Ngo Dinh Diem regime in South Vietnam was a controversial issue during the Eisenhower and Kennedy years, straining the executive-legislative relationship and provoking discord within Congress. For Dwight D. Eisenhower, the programme was the best means of containing communism, short of ordering American forces to the region. Both major parties were divided on the issue. Conservatives and liberals in each party perceived foreign aid differently. / Old Guard Republicans and southern Democrats were skeptical about the expensive assistance programme. They contended that the "give-away" legislation would undermine Saigon's resolve to attain economic and political autonomy. Generally suspicious of America's allies, conservatives were especially critical toward Diem since they considered him an unproven ally who could take advantage of United States' generosity. Liberal Republicans and Democrats, who harboured an internationalist perspective, acknowledged foreign aid as a legitimate means of countering communism. Perceiving Diem as an alternative to Ho Chi Minh's leadership and Bao Dai's incompetence, liberals supported the Premier's pro-democratic aspirations. / The French reversal at Dien Bien Phu, the "fiasco" of the Geneva Conference, and the subsequent foreign assistance investigations by the legislative branch brought about a tenuous truce between conservatives and liberals. Although fundamental differences remained, both groups were convinced that a reappraisal of the aid programme was needed before the President committed America too heavily in Vietnam. The increasing commitments by Eisenhower's successor and his lack of co-operation with Capitol Hill solidified the conservative-liberal entente. Diem's assassination in November 1963 sobered Congress and strengthened its disapproval of America's assistance policy. Such congressional activism peaked by the late 1960's and early 1970's. The experience acquired during the Eisenhower and Kennedy years allowed Congress, not the President, to oppose United States military intervention in Vietnam during the Nixon Presidency. It also provided the initiative to rationalize the foreign aid legislation, favoring economic and technical development rather than military commitments.

Identiferoai:union.ndltd.org:LACETR/oai:collectionscanada.gc.ca:QMM.39509
Date January 1992
CreatorsDoré, Gilbert
ContributorsRandall, Stephen J. (advisor)
PublisherMcGill University
Source SetsLibrary and Archives Canada ETDs Repository / Centre d'archives des thèses électroniques de Bibliothèque et Archives Canada
LanguageEnglish
Detected LanguageEnglish
TypeElectronic Thesis or Dissertation
Formatapplication/pdf
CoverageDoctor of Philosophy (Department of History.)
RightsAll items in eScholarship@McGill are protected by copyright with all rights reserved unless otherwise indicated.
Relationalephsysno: 001325975, proquestno: NN87599, Theses scanned by UMI/ProQuest.

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