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Water scarcity and optimal pricing of water

In the first chapter, I consider the institutional structures as well as the doctrines typically encountered in the surface water sector. To investigate the sources and methods of government support in the water sector, I categorize different sorts of government support according to the location of water along the water cycle. I conclude the section with examples of observed water markets.
In the second chapter, I consider the problem of water usage, developing a model to analyze the optimal pricing of water within a second-best economy. As a water supplier, the local government may price discriminate across consumers and farmers. I introduce the second-best pricing scheme, derive conditions for the marginal-cost pricing and inverse-elasticity rules, and analyze when the government optimally deviates from these two pricing schemes.
In the third chapter, I provide an analysis of the data I collected from Turkey. First, I examine the data on reservoir flows, including service share and fixed costs of the reservoirs. Then, I provide details about the relationship between the quantity and price of irrigation and of tap water.
Finally, in the fourth chapter, I apply the theoretical framework to the data from Turkey. In Turkey, the current water-pricing policy is dictated by the sole objective of breaking-even in each period. This results in large withdrawals, which is not sustainable in the long-run, hence not optimal. I analyze the dynamic optimal water resource management problem of a benevolent government. I compare the implications of the current and the optimal pricing policies.

Identiferoai:union.ndltd.org:uiowa.edu/oai:ir.uiowa.edu:etd-1918
Date01 July 2010
CreatorsSağlam, Yiğit
ContributorsPaarsch, Harry J., Govindan, Srihari
PublisherUniversity of Iowa
Source SetsUniversity of Iowa
LanguageEnglish
Detected LanguageEnglish
Typedissertation
Formatapplication/pdf
SourceTheses and Dissertations
RightsCopyright © 2010 Yiğit Sağlam

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