In science all hypothesis-testing rely on a multitude of background assumptions.However, the Quine-Duhem thesis tells us that upon refutation, or disconfirma-tion, there is no principled way of determining which of these assumptions shouldbe abandoned in light of the evidence. Attempts have been made to provideBayesian models that can provide a logic to resolve this problem. In this paperI identify, describe, compare and evaluate two such models. The first is dueto John Dorling and the second to Michael Strevens. I argue that Dorling’ssolution to the problem presented by the Quine-Duhem thesis is preferable tothat proposed by Strevens. / <p>Spring semester 2024</p>
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:UPSALLA1/oai:DiVA.org:uu-531148 |
| Date | January 2024 |
| Creators | Lagerlöf, Julius |
| Publisher | Uppsala universitet, Filosofiska institutionen |
| Source Sets | DiVA Archive at Upsalla University |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Student thesis, info:eu-repo/semantics/bachelorThesis, text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
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