Because the past researches of the North Korea¡¦s nuclear problem are devoid of a classical geopolitics approach, this article will explain this problem from the traditional ¡§buffer state¡¨ approach.
Nuclear weapons symbolize absolute attack ability. Because of many limitations superpowers cannot smoothly transform nuclear weapons to a deterrence function; however, small countries have advantages that superpowers do not possess in using nuclear weapons so they can break these limitations and favorably transform nuclear weapons to a deterrence function.
North Korea can take these advantages to change the fate of geopolitics in the past, which was a weak buffer state, and use nuclear weapons to stabilize the whole buffer system to achieve the goal of extending the peacetime. Thus, North Korea's very effort to obtain nuclear weapons is the process of stabilizing the buffer system but this does not mean that North Korea can sit without worries. The problem of the successor and the economic breakdown are two Achilles' heels in North Korea, both of which have the risk that will destroy the whole buffer system.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:NSYSU/oai:NSYSU:etd-0724109-123150 |
| Date | 24 July 2009 |
| Creators | Chen, Yu-hua |
| Contributors | Lin, Wen-Cheng, Dzeng, Yi-Ren, Lo, Chih-Cheng |
| Publisher | NSYSU |
| Source Sets | NSYSU Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Archive |
| Language | Cholon |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Source | http://etd.lib.nsysu.edu.tw/ETD-db/ETD-search/view_etd?URN=etd-0724109-123150 |
| Rights | not_available, Copyright information available at source archive |
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