During the Second World War, the Canadian government could claim only moderate success for its information operations.
To begin with, the government had difficulty in 1939 establishing its first-ever, full-scale wartime information agency, the Bureau of Public Information, and providing it with an effective organization and policy. Various outside interests, particularly Canadian newspapers and social scientists, pressed the government to adopt a policy which reflected their particular views on the role of wartime information in a liberal democratic system. After trying out an information policy that rested on facilitating newspaper coverage, the minister of National War Services with responsibility
for public information allowed the director of Public Information to expand his activities in an ad hoc manner and to adopt newspaper or social scientific techniques if he saw fit.
This approach satisfied no one and led to a complete reorganization of information work in 1942 and the formation of the Wartime Information Board, the Bureau's replacement, which finally emerged with a policy in 1943. The chief architect
of the new approach, John Grierson, wanted to use the social sciences in an integrated media approach that explained how democracy fit into an increasingly complex, technological society. But this was difficult. The WIB could not avoid involvement in conflicting currents of midwar opinion. Orthodox
free-enterprisers asserted the primacy of private business
while anyone with opinions to the left of them urged varying degrees of social change. The reformers themselves, however, could not agree on the desirable measures. After barely escaping the crossfire, Grierson resigned in 1944. The new general manager, A.D. Dunton, finally succeeded in setting up a smoothly-run operation that generally followed Grierson's direction. At the same time that the board was explaining democratic
procedures to Canadians, however, political interference in its operations demonstrated that the new propaganda techniques
could be manipulated for possibly undemocratic ends.
The evolution of official wartime ideology more or less parallelled policy development. The Bureau began by trying
to establish a concept of Canadian nationalism that encompassed
a mixture of chauvinistic patriotism and a general realization of the outlines of Canadian nationhood. In the wartime context, this meant presenting a view of the enemy, of the allies and of wartime events that would mobilize Canadians to support the government's policies. It also involved trying to define a view of 'Canadianism' that would encompass the ethnic community as well as English and French Canadians. By the middle of the war, it was obvious that this approach had not proved satisfactory. The BPI's successor, the Wartime Information Board could not totally reorient all these operations
but did manage to establish new programmes that took a different approach to Canadian nationhood. Basically, these programmes tried to awaken a sense of participation in alienated groups, to take individual needs into account and to provoke discussion about the direction of government policy. The
propaganda operations, however, were not totally reoriented and retained some elements of chauvinistic patriotism. The new system, despite its success in heading off popular discontent,
opened the door to manipulation of public opinion. / Arts, Faculty of / History, Department of / Graduate
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:UBC/oai:circle.library.ubc.ca:2429/21320 |
| Date | January 1978 |
| Creators | Young, W. R. |
| Source Sets | University of British Columbia |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Text, Thesis/Dissertation |
| Rights | For non-commercial purposes only, such as research, private study and education. Additional conditions apply, see Terms of Use https://open.library.ubc.ca/terms_of_use. |
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