Topic of this thesis is Dennett's criticism of the philosophical notion of qualia. First, the notion of qualia and the meaning it acquires within philosophy are introduced. Then, four thought experiments are presented to serve as an argument in favor of existence of qualia along with Dennett's reaction to these thought experiments. After that, Dennett's criticism of qualia as immediately apprehensible, ineffable, intrinsic and private properties of conscious mental states is introduced while one of the most common objections to this criticism is emphasized - Dennett's conception of qualia is too narrow and we can preserve it in a moderate way. Subsequently, the thesis outlines such a modest concept - the concept of phenomenal consciousness. This thesis attempts to show that there is no place for phenomenal consciousness in Dennett's heterophenomenology and Multiple Drafts model and that Dennett is as skeptical about this term as he is about the notion of qualia. In the end, the thesis asks the question whether it is really necessary to give up the concept of phenomenal consciousness if we want to study consciousness scientifically - from the third-person point of view.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:nusl.cz/oai:invenio.nusl.cz:358093 |
| Date | January 2017 |
| Creators | Kubelková, Kateřina |
| Contributors | Hill, James, Kolman, Vojtěch |
| Source Sets | Czech ETDs |
| Language | Czech |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | info:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesis |
| Rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess |
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