Since most audit engagements identify multiple proposed audit adjustments, auditors must decide how best to present and negotiate these adjustments with their clients. Auditors may negotiate adjustments individually as they are uncovered over the course of field work (a sequential strategy) or they may aggregate all identified adjustments together and negotiate them at the same time (a simultaneous strategy). This paper examines the relative effectiveness of a simultaneous versus sequential negotiation strategy in eliciting concessions from clients and engendering positive affect toward the auditor. Managers negotiated a series of audit adjustments with a simulated auditor who employed one of the two negotiation strategies. I find that a simultaneous strategy elicited significantly greater total concessions from participants and also generated greater positive affect. I also manipulate the magnitude of the issues negotiated and find that significantly greater concessions are offered when larger issues are presented first. The implications of my findings for audit research and practice are discussed.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:UMASS/oai:scholarworks.umass.edu:dissertations-6525 |
| Date | 01 January 2011 |
| Creators | Perreault, Stephen Joseph |
| Publisher | ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst |
| Source Sets | University of Massachusetts, Amherst |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | text |
| Source | Doctoral Dissertations Available from Proquest |
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