This thesis is a critical examination of three influential and
interrelated aspects of Donald Davidson’s philosophy of action.. The
first issue that is considered is Davidson’s account of the logical
form of action—sentences. After assessing the argument in support
of Davidson’s account, and suggesting certain amendments to it, I
show how this modified version of Davidson’s account can be
extended to provide for more complicated types of action—sentences.
The second issue that is considered is Davidson’s views concerning
the individuation of actions; in particular, I examine Davidson’s
theory concerning the ontological implications of those sentences
that assert that an agent did something by means of doing something
else. The conclusion that I seek to establish in this case is
essentially negative—that Davidson’s theory is false. The third
issue that is considered is Davidson’s theory concerning the
logical implications of those sentences that assert that an agent
did something as a means of doing something else, which is also
commonly known as the causal theory of action. Here I argue against
Davidson’s view by providing an alternative, and more satisfying
response to the theoretical challenge that generates the causal
theory. Subsequent to this I attempt to explain what motivates
Davidson’s commitment to the causal theory. / Arts, Faculty of / Philosophy, Department of / Graduate
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:UBC/oai:circle.library.ubc.ca:2429/7545 |
| Date | 11 1900 |
| Creators | McGuire, John Michael |
| Source Sets | University of British Columbia |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Text, Thesis/Dissertation |
| Format | 2391499 bytes, application/pdf |
| Rights | For non-commercial purposes only, such as research, private study and education. Additional conditions apply, see Terms of Use https://open.library.ubc.ca/terms_of_use. |
Page generated in 0.0129 seconds