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Foreign Aid, Rent-Seeking and Economic Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa

Three studies on foreign aid, rent-seeking, and economic growth in sub-Saharan Africa are presented. The first study examines the possible simultaneity that may exist between a donor’s provision of aid and the rentseeking (corruption) activities in the recipient country. Does the amount of aid depend on the lack of corruption in a country? Simultaneously, does the level of corruption depend on the amount of aid and the type of donor? The main goals of this paper are to examine whether such simultaneity exists and whether the impact of aid depends on the type of the donor, either multilateral or bilateral. The second study extends the first model by incorporating an additional equation for GDP per capita. It examines whether simultaneity exists between the three variables: foreign aid, corruption, and GDP per capita and whether the relationship depends upon the source of the foreign aid. Adding GDP per capita as an endogenous variable will provide another key to understanding the lack of long-term effectiveness for foreign aid in sub-Saharan Africa. The third and final study uses a fixed effects model to examine the relationship between foreign aid and the level of corruption in sub-Saharan Africa. Accounting for fixed effects allows me to examine whether unobserved characteristics of recipient countries play a role in explaining the impact of aid on corruption.

Identiferoai:union.ndltd.org:MSSTATE/oai:scholarsjunction.msstate.edu:td-3319
Date09 August 2008
CreatorsMojire, Takele Tassew
PublisherScholars Junction
Source SetsMississippi State University
Detected LanguageEnglish
Typetext
Formatapplication/pdf
SourceTheses and Dissertations

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