We study the supply chain with two manufacturers producing
competing products and selling them through a common retailer. The
two manufacturers must decide on the wholesale price and the level
of service they plan to provide to the consumer. Each firm are
assumed to optimize only its own profit (uncoordinated). The
consumer demand depends on two factors: (1) retail price, and (2)
service level provided by the manufacturer. We extend the study on
this basic model in three directions. First, we explore the role
of bargaining power in supply chain strategic interactions. We
derive and compare equilibrium solutions for the supply chain
under three different scenarios (e.g., Manufacturer Stackelberg,
Retailer Stackelberg, and Vertical Nash). Second, we extend the
framework to study multi-period model. In this model, demand also
depends on the past period retail prices and service levels, as
well as current prices and service levels. Game-theoretic
approaches and dynamic system and control theory are used as tools
to model the problem. Finally, we examine a single period problem
with stochastic demand. When demand is uncertain, the retailer
faces a newsvendor-type problem. In our model, the newsvendor must
manage two competing products against a price-dependent demand. We
derive an expression for the newsvendor's optimal retail prices.
Next, we provide an algorithm to search for the equilibrium
wholesale price and service level, given that the manufacturers
know the retailer's reaction function. Some numerical examples are provided.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:GATECH/oai:smartech.gatech.edu:1853/8053 |
| Date | 06 April 2004 |
| Creators | Charoensiriwath, Chayakrit |
| Publisher | Georgia Institute of Technology |
| Source Sets | Georgia Tech Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Archive |
| Language | en_US |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Dissertation |
| Format | 1968227 bytes, application/pdf |
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