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The effects of venture capital syndicate diversity on earnings management and performance of IPOs in the US and UK: An institutional perspective

This study examines the extent to which principal-principal agency conflicts within venture capital (VC) syndicates lead to additional principal-agent conflicts in IPO firms in two institutional contexts. Using a matched sample of 274 VC-backed IPOs in the US and the UK, it shows that the diversity of a VC syndicate increases pre-IPO discretionary current accruals, used as a proxy for earnings management, but the impact of such diversity is higher in the US. There
is also evidence of higher underpricing and lower aftermarket performance in firms with higher
earnings management and VC diversity, and these negative performance effects are also higher in the US. Our findings indicate that local and informal institutions have a significant effect on multiple agency conflicts in IPO firms and performance outcomes.

Identiferoai:union.ndltd.org:VIENNA/oai:epub.wu-wien.ac.at:3486
Date January 2012
CreatorsChahine, Salim, Arthurs, Johnathan D., Filatotchev, Igor, Hoskisson, Robert E.
PublisherElsevier
Source SetsWirtschaftsuniversität Wien
LanguageEnglish
Detected LanguageEnglish
TypeArticle, PeerReviewed
Formatapplication/pdf
Relationhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2011.11.007, http://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/homepage.cws_home, http://epub.wu.ac.at/3486/

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