Název diplomové práce: Mysl a vědomí u zvířat Vedoucí práce: prof. Karel Thein, Ph.D. Vypracovala: Bc. Klaudie Richterová Abstract This thesis examines the issue of cognition, mind and consciousness of living beings other than humans. It starts with the attitudes of two contemporary thinkers: Thomas Nagel and Daniel C. Dennett. In connection with their opinions, this thesis examines a certain number of questions: Might there be something like a subjective experience of life or being? How can one know that others have mental states that are like one's own? How important is a fact that nonhuman animals cannot describe their mental states in language? Is it possible to connect the observable characteristics of animals (behavioral or neurological) to consciousness? Nagel assumes that individuals have a proprietary perspective on their own perceptual, cognitive and emotive processes. Dennett argues that consciousness is essentially an illusion created by language, which is why he concludes that consciousness is uniquely human. What complicates the whole issue is the essential inwardness of the conscious experience. We objectivize this inwardness per our aim to know, and thus deprive it of its essence. Thereby, very often, we lose sight of what we want to examine.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:nusl.cz/oai:invenio.nusl.cz:370043 |
| Date | January 2017 |
| Creators | Richterová, Klaudie |
| Contributors | Thein, Karel, Jirsa, Jakub |
| Source Sets | Czech ETDs |
| Language | Czech |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | info:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesis |
| Rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess |
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