This study investigates ethical argumentation in Perelman and
Gadamer to claim that the central theoretical framework in each
philosophy simultaneously inflects and deflects available avenues of
persuasion. I argue in each system there is a “confused notion” whose
ambiguity underpins the available methods of rhetorical argument.
For Perelman, the confused notion of the universal audience and its
relationship to epideictic rhetoric determines the form of ethical
persuasion that requires consensus in order to incite action for justice.
For Gadamer, the confused notion of Vorurteil (prejudice, or fore-
judgment) is used to critique tradition, Enlightenment reason, and
historical hermeneutics. This mode of ethical argument suggests that
open dialogue with an other is the best means for addressing prejudice in
order to reach mutual understanding.
I argue that by placing these two approaches to ethical argument into
critical dialogue, their respective capacities, limitations, and distinctive
rhetorical outcomes can be more clearly apprehended. / 10000-01-01
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:uoregon.edu/oai:scholarsbank.uoregon.edu:1794/22648 |
| Date | 06 September 2017 |
| Creators | Major, Julia |
| Contributors | Frank, David |
| Publisher | University of Oregon |
| Source Sets | University of Oregon |
| Language | en_US |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Electronic Thesis or Dissertation |
| Rights | All Rights Reserved. |
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